ABSTRACT: An axiomatic characterization of a 'two-level Hamiltonian structure' is proposed, which expresses the optico-mechanical analogy by representing optics and mechanics as (disjoint) classes of models satisfying the axioms. There is the 'Hamilton-Jacobi level,' which involves a differential manifold on which the characteristic function satisfying the Hamilton-Jacobi equation is defined; and the 'symplectic level,' involving the Hamiltonian, defined on the cotangent bundle of the manifold. The two levels, with the (analogous) structures on them, concern both optics and mechanics.
Introduction
The optico-mechanical analogy, which arguably had a central role in the development of wave mechanics, 1 is usually expressed 2 by describing analytical mechanics and geometrical optics separately, then pointing out a handful of similarities, sometimes by means of a 'dictionary' indicating correspondences between analogous objects: between the mechanical potential and the optical index of refraction, between mechanical trajectories and optical rays and so forth. In such approaches the 'analogy' has a tenuous, insubstantial status, entirely subordinate to the theories, which are primary. To give the analogy itself more substance and an appropriate primacy, to turn it into an object in its own right (and " give to airy nothing a local habitation and a name"), one can, rather than just noting a few resemblances, abstract a common structure 3 possessing optical and mechanical models. The difference is perhaps one of emphasis and degree, for even a statement of similarities might be viewed as a rough description of structure; but the degree seems considerable. Of the various resources available for the characterization of structure, those of settheoretical axiomatization, associated chiefly with Patrick Suppes, seem appropriate here and will be adopted. The axioms will not be intended-unlike those of, say, a group or a vector space-as a 'necessary and sufficient' basis for deduction, only as a summary of structure, a delineation of Gestalt. An appropriate 'completeness' (perhaps allowing the derivation of all important theorems) and 'independence' are sometimes expected of axioms, but will not be sought here; genuine completeness is unattainable, practically at any rate, and independence is both hard to characterize exactly and unnecessarily stringent. The axioms are only meant to emphasize certain features of the structure that best represent it and are judged significant.
1 See de Broglie (1925) and Schrödinger (1926 Schrödinger ( , 1934 ; but also Wessel (1979) . 2 See Arnol'd (1997) for instance. 3 "Structure," in the language of model theory, is often a synonym of "model." Here it is more like a synonym of "theory." 2 2 Set-theoretical axiomatization Set-theoretical methods have been explicitly used for the axiomatization of scientific theories since did so, giving rise to a considerable 'structuralist' 4 literature. Patrick Suppes, who sought to extend the methods of Bourbaki to the natural sciences, has had a fundamental role in the programme, especially in its early days; subsequent developments, stressing semantics, have also been due to Sneed (1971) , Stegmüller (1973 Stegmüller ( , 1980 , Balzer et al. (1987) and others. Mechanical theories have served as paradigmatic examples since the beginning: 'classical particle mechanics' was axiomatized in , and Suppes (1999 Suppes ( , 2002 ; Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics in Sneed (1971) . Optical theories have received less attention. Set-theoretical characterization of Hamilton-Jacobi theory or the optico-mechanical analogy has not yet been attempted. Economy is central to the approach; set-theoretical methods lend themselves to the omission of what is taken for granted or 'understood,' such as rules of inference, set theory itself, or staple mathematics. No attempt is made at exhaustive characterization of logical structure; only what is considered relevant and worth mentioning is included. Even the simplest scientific theories can involve many sets, functions and axioms, many more than deserve attention; most are left out.
Suppose we want to give a standard formalization of elementary probability theory. On the one hand, if we follow the standard approach, we need axioms about sets to make sense even of talk about the joint occurrence of two events, for their events are represented as sets and their joint occurrence as their set-theoretical intersection. On the other hand, we need axioms about the real numbers as well, for we shall want to talk about the numerical probabilities of events. Finally, after stating a group of axioms on sets, and another group on the real numbers, we are in a position to state the axioms that belong just to probability theory as it is usually conceived. In this welter of axioms, those proper to probability theory can easily be lost sight of. More important, it is senseless and uninteresting continually to repeat these general axioms on sets and on numbers whenever we consider formalizing a scientific theory. No one does it, and for good reason.
5
A theory is characterized in the structuralist approach by a set-theoretical predicate-like 'is a classical particle mechanics' or 'is a group'-involving the basic objects and axioms of the theory; or equivalently by the extension of the predicate, in other words by the class of models satisfying the axioms.
3 Here a theory with very different models is axiomatized. Set-theoretical methods free the mathematical theory from association with particular kinds of models, and can be applied, unlike other formal methods, without regard for specific application. 6 Furthermore a given set-theoretical structure can not only admit diverse physical models, but even abstract mathematical models:
It is one of the theses of this book that there is no theoretical way of drawing a sharp distinction between a piece of pure mathematics and a piece of theoretical science. The set-theoretical definitions of the theory of mechanics, the theory of thermodynamics, and a theory of learning, to give three rather disparate examples, are on all fours with the definitions of the purely mathematical theories of groups, rings, fields, etc. From a philosophical standpoint there is no sharp distinction between pure and applied mathematics, in spite of much talk to the contrary. Indeed it will be unclear, and unimportant, whether mathematics or physics is really at issue here.
What is meant here by 'optico-mechanical analogy' is that two disjoint classes of models-optical and mechanical-satisfy the axioms proposed. The optical models only add semantics to the abstract scheme, whereas further logical structure (basic objects and axioms) is provided for mechanical models.
The general outlines of the structure common to analytical mechanics and geometrical optics will be described with broad brushstrokes, without aiming at generality or rigour. Coordinates will be avoided to keep the presentation simple and clean, not for rigour. Global issues-conjugate points etc.-will also be avoided, however relevant they may be to optics.
Two-level Hamiltonian structure
The theory expressing the optico-mechanical analogy will itself involve a further analogy, between two 'substructures' it contains, one on an underlying manifold, the other on its cotangent bundle. At either level, briefly, the differential of a real-valued function (the characteristic function on the underlying manifold, the Hamiltonian on the cotangent bundle) gets turned into a vector field tangent to a congruence by means of a twice-covariant tensor (the metric tensor in one case, the symplectic two-form in the other); one can say the function generates the congruence. Of course there are differences: the symplectic two-form is skew-symmetric whereas the metric tensor is symmetric; the Hamiltonian is largely arbitrary, whereas the characteristic function has to satisfy a differential equation (but with much freedom in the choice of initial conditions). One can speak, perhaps loosely, of a 'Hamilton-Jacobi' substructure on 4 the underlying manifold and of a 'symplectic' substructure on the cotangent bundle. Together they make a 'two-level Hamiltonian structure. ' Both substructures involve the six objects # , , , , , : ( , , , , , )
are not independent; the three freely-chosen ones are the manifold Q, which determines ; Γ the function , f Γ which then generates the congruence ; Γ Φ and finally the surface 0 , Q which gives Q f and . 
